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I. INTRODUCTION
The more I think about the President's declaration as to the right of "self-
determination," the more convinced I am of the danger of. ... such ideas ....
The phrase is simply loaded with dynamite. It will raise hopes which can never
be realized. It will, I fear, cost thousands of lives .... What a calamity that the
phrase was ever uttered! What misery it will cause!1
After the First World War, the victorious powers assembled at
Versailles were faced with the dilemma of how to govern the culturally
varied territories of two defeated empires.' The American President
Woodrow Wilson arrived in France armed with the new notion that all
peoples had a right to self-determination. 3  At the time, President
1. ROBERT LANSING, THE PEACE NEGOTIATIONS: A PERSONAL NARRATIVE 97-98
(1921). Robert Lansing, Secretary of State, proclaimed his fears on December 30, 1918
in a response to President Woodrow Wilson's articulation of the principle of self-
determination. See id.
2. Laurence S. Hanauer, Article, The Irrelevance of Self-Determination Law to
Ethno-National Conflict: A New Look at the Western Sahara Case, 9 EMORY INT'L L.
REV. 133 (1995).
3. See Lung-Chu Chen, Self-Determination and World Public Order, 66 NOTRE
DAMEL. REV. 1287, 1288 (1991).
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Wilson's concept was primarily perceived as a moral and political
right, which was not, as such, legally enforceable.4 Virtually no
precedent existed for the idea that "uncivilized" peoples had any legal
right to be independent, choose their own government, and determine
their own future.5
Since its first formal appearance during the negotiations that led to the
Treaty of Versailles, the right of self-determination has become one of
the most often invoked human rights of international law. 6 The United
Nations facilitated the development of this right in a colonial context by
pursuing the independence of trust territories and non-self-governing
territories.7 Nowadays, it has become a tool mostly used by sub-groups
within countries to ensure their continued existence as a unique culture.
8
"While the world contains about [two hundred independent countries],
there are about [three thousand] different linguistic groups and easily
[five thousand] distinct national minorities."9  Further, "[c]ontinued
diversity is their goal, and self-determination is the banner under which
they march to realize that goal, whether independently from the unified
state in which they exist or within it."'
After looking at the concept of self-determination, its history, meaning,
and possible future development in Part II, this paper will develop two case
studies. Part III examines the right of self-determination for the people
of Gibraltar, analyzing the relevant U.N. resolutions, agreements, treaties,
and legislation that have defined the dispute between Great Britain and
Spain. For example, Great Britain has ruled the Rock of Gibraltar for
280 years, primarily using it as a military base; but, today, Spain insists
4. See Hanauer, supra note 2, at 133.
5. Id.
6. Gerry J. Simpson, The Diffusion of Sovereignty: Self-Determination in the
Post-colonial Age, 32 STAN. J. INT'L L. 255, 258 (1996).
7. See Chen, supra note 3, at 1289.
8. Michael J. Kelly, Political Downsizing: The Re-Emergence of Self-
Determination, and the Movement toward Smaller, Ethnically Homogenous States, 47
DRAKE L. REv. 209, 211-12 (1999). Some of the better known groups and peoples
claiming independence include the Kurds, the Quebecois, the Basques, the Scots, the
Palestinians, the East Timores, the Tamils, the Karen peoples in Burma, the Ambonese
and Aceh Merdeka in Indonesia, the Chittagong Hill Tribes in Bangladesh, the South
Ossetians in Georgia, the Naga peoples in India, the Catholic Irish in Northern Ireland,
and the Western Saharans under defacto control by the Moroccans. All of these groups
claim some form of independence, and together they represent more than fifty million
people. See Simpson, supra note 6, at 258-59, 259 n. 18.
9. Kelly, supra note 8, at 212.
10. Id.
that it did not relinquish absolute sovereignty over Gibraltar to the
British by the Treaty of Utrecht in 1713. Part IV examines the situation
of the Channel Islands, specifically the Bailiwicks of Guernsey and
Jersey, which are not strictly speaking, part of the United Kingdom, but
are in "appenage", or possessed by the British Crown. The Channel
Islands came into Crown possession during the Norman Conquest of
1066 when they formed part of the Duchy of Normandy." While being
culturally distinct from the United Kingdom, the Channel Islands are
governed under British rule. 12 Finally, Part V will conclude whether the
case studies fall within the scope of self-determination, as currently
understood by the world's legal community.
II. SELF-DETERMINATION
A. History
At the beginning of history, there was the family.'3 The family grouped
together into the clan or tribe. 14 "The tribe begot the nation and the nation
begot the kingdom."'15 Eventually, kingdoms became empires and empires
became nation-states.' 6 Conquest and subjugation of people as well as
people's revolts resisting this state expansion and annexation have been
a constant theme throughout history.17 These revolts and resurgences are
known nowadays as self-determination.' 8
With the rise of nationalism and the establishment of the nation-states
during the sixteenth century, self-determination became an important
force.'9 The Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 represents the first known
codification of these nationalistic principles into international law. 2' The
nationalistic drives for self-determination were reinforced with the
growth of empires during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.2'
Most commentators agree that the modern understanding of the principle
of self-determination started with the dismantling of the Ottoman and
11. See Channel Islands, 3 THE NEW ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 87 (15th ed. 1998).
12. See id.





18. See id. Self-determination is the legal term for the age-old force behind the
Celtic, Pictish, and Jewish resistance of Roman domination; the Scottish revolts against
the British Crown; the Arabic insurgence against the Ottoman Sultanate; and, the Native
American fight against the United States. Id.
19. See Eric Kolodner, Essay, The Future of the Right to Self-Determination, 10
CONN. J. INT'L L. 153, 154 (1994).
20. See id.
21. See id.
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Austro-Hungarian empires after the First World War.22  The principle
then served to maintain world order and peace; empires were divided
into smaller nation-states on the belief that smaller and more culturally
unified countries would better represent the will of those governed and
therefore avert internal and international unrest.2 3
The principle of self-determination crystallized under the leadership of
the American President Woodrow Wilson at the end of the First World
War. In Wilson's words:
No peace can last, or ought to last, which does not recognize and accept the
principle that governments derive all their just powers from the consent of the
governed, and that no right anywhere exists to hand people about from
sovereignty to sovereignty as if they were property.
24
However, the principle of self-determination was not accepted as part of
international law at that time.
25
After the Allied forces' victory in the First World War, the Treaty of
Versailles 26 re-drew the world map by forcibly 27 breaking up empires so
22. Id.; Chen, supra note 3, at 1288; Hanauer, supra note 2, at 138.
23. Kolodner, supra note 19, at 154. See also Chen, supra note 3, at 1288.
24. 54 CONG. REC. 1741, 1742 (1917) (Address by President Woodrow Wilson,
U.S. Senate, Jan. 22, 1917). This concept was included among President Wilson's
Fourteen Points for peace. See Hanauer, supra note 2, at 138. A similar principle was
at the time articulated by the Soviet leader Vladimir Lenin. See Kelly, supra note 8, at
214. Although the concept of each president was the same, the philosophies behind
the concept were vastly different. Id. Lenin, while advocating violent secession,
interpreted the principle as a means to liberate people from exploitative bourgeois
governments in pursuit of a socialist regime. Id. Wilson, on the other hand, gave the
concept a peaceful meaning wherein the consent of the governed to their sovereign
was ascertained. Id. at 215.
25. See Hurst Hannum, Rethinking Self-Determination, 34 VA. J. INT'L L. 1, 3, 12
(1993). Although self-determination was advocated-as a general principle after the First
World War, neither President Wilson, nor the other Allies believed that the principle was
absolute or universal. Id.
26. This peace treaty between the wartime coalition and Germany was signed at
the royal palace of Versailles on June 28, 1919. See WILLIAM R. KEYLOR, THE
TWENTIETH-CENTURY WORLD: AN INTERNATIONAL HISTORY 84 (3d ed. 1996).
27. Kelly, supra note 8, at 215. The actual map drawing was done with little
regard to the wishes of the local populations. Id. at 215 n.23; ANTONIO CASSESSE, SELF-
DETERMINATION OF PEOPLES: A LEGAL REAPPRAISAL 24 (1995). Hardly any opportunity
was given to peoples to express themselves through uniformly conducted plebiscites, as
Wilson had envisioned. See id.
The exceptions include a plebiscite in North Schleswig, which had been [the
object of a] dispute between Denmark and Prussia since the mid-nineteenth
century; three plebiscites concerned with the Polish-German border... ; a
plebiscite in the Klagenfurt Basin in 1920; a plebiscite in the small area of
Sopron in dispute between Austria and Hungary; and the 1935 [plebiscite] in
smaller nation-states could emerge under President Wilson's philosophy
of self-determination.
28
After the war, the League of Nations29 indirectly addressed the principle
of self-determination through the creation of a system of mandates
pursuant to article 22 of the League Covenant. 30  Believing that "the
development of colonial people formerly under the [government] of the
defeated countries was 'a sacred trust of civilization,' various members
of the [Allied Forces] agreed to administer fourteen territories under the
League's supervision." 31 These mandate countries' right to independence
was not a legal right, but was rather considered to be a question of fact
depending on whether the mandate is "able to stand by [itself] under the
strenuous conditions of the modern world., 32 Although the League of
Nations' Covenant did not grant outright independence to the mandates,
it did make a significant step forward in the treatment of colonies by
granting them certain legal rights and protections.33
Although the principle of self-determination had thus made its first
appearance on the international stage, it was still regarded as a mere
the Saar region, which returned [this region] to Germany after fifteen years of
French [rule].
Hannum, supra note 25, at 5.
28. Kelly, supra note 8, at 215.
[T]he Ottoman Empire [was reduced to present-day] Turkey and became a
republic, while its former... Arab territories [were divided into] Iraq, Syria,
Trans-Jordan, Lebanon, Palestine, and... Saudi Arabia; the Austro-Hungarian
Hapsburg Empire disintegrated into Yugoslavia, Hungary, Czechoslovakia,
and Austria; Poland emerged from the ashes of Eastern Germany, the Western
portion of Czarist Russia, and the northeastern extremity of Austria-Hungary;
and the Baltic Republics (Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia) and Finland were carved
out of the Russian Empire.
Id.
29. The League of Nations was created in 1919 and sought to promote international co-
operation, peace, and security. MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 748-49
(1991). Because the United States and the Soviet Union refused to become members, the
League of Nations was mainly a European-centered institution. Id. "It was formally
dissolved in April 1946." Id.
30. Hannum, supra note 25, at 6. However, Article 22 itself refrains from mentioning
the principle of self-determination. Hanauer, supra note 2, at 139.
31. Hannum, supra note 25, at 6. These fourteen territories included Iraq
(administered by Great Britain), Palestine and Trans-Jordan (Great Britain), Syria and
Lebanon (France), Tanganyika (Great Britain), Ruanda-Urundi (Belgium), British
Cameroons (Great Britain), British Togo (Great Britain), French Cameroons (France),
French Togo (France), Nauru (Great Britain), New Guinea (Australia), Western Samoa
(New Zealand), South West Africa (South Africa), and the North Pacific Islands (Japan).
Id. at 6 n.22.
32. LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT art. 22(f). See also Hanauer, supra note 2,
at 139.
33. Hanauer, supra note 2, at 139. The mandatory power must, for example, guarantee
freedom of religion, prohibit the slave trade, and look after the well-being and development of
the peoples. Id.
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political principle, considered to be inferior to the more institutionalized
international principles of state sovereignty and territorial integrity.
34
Indeed, when the principle of self-determination was included by
President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill in the Atlantic
Charter in August 1941, Churchill proclaimed it to be applicable only
to those "nations of Europe under the Nazi yoke" 35 and not to
European colonial possessions.36
B. General Scope and Content
1. Decolonization
As the long process of decolonization began after the Second World
War, the principle of self-determination made its reappearance on the
international stage, evolving beyond Churchill's careful moralistic
assertion and transforming itself into a "right".37 This right was only
applicable to colonies; the principle remained a merely moral concept
outside the colonial context.38 While the United States unequivocally
supported the principle of self-determination during the drafting of the
U.N. Charter in 1945, the British view was more paternalistic. 39 Eager
to support the nationalistic feelings in the European colonies, the United
States was nevertheless hesitant about alienating its allies in the face of a
newly perceived Soviet threat.40 This American stance allowed the major
colonial powers to influence the adoption of an imprecise principle of
self-determination in the U.N. Charter.
4 1
34. Kelly, supra note 8, at 215-16.
35. Id. at 216.
36. See id.
37. See id. at 216. See also Hannum, supra note 25, at 12; Simpson, supra note 6,
at 265.
38. See Kelly, supra note 8, at 216. Despite continued claims of a right of
secession by nationalistic groups in Africa, Asia, and the former Soviet Union, the
international community has accepted no such right. International law does not contain a
prohibition against secession, whether voluntarily or by use of force. It has never
recognized a right to secede nor even identified the conditions that might give rise to the
claim. Id.
39. Simpson, supra note 6, at 265. The Western powers initially refused to accept
a principle of self-determination, fearful that it might be used to facilitate the
dismemberment of their empires. An outright rejection of the principle of self-
determination by the European powers was prevented by the American distaste for
European colonialism. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 265-66.
The principle of self-determination is mentioned only twice in the
U.N. Charter.42 Both times, the application is limited to "developing
friendly relations among nations ' 43 and in conjunction with the
principle of "equal rights.., of peoples." 44 The reference to "peoples"
includes groups beyond states and non-self-governing territories
"whose peoples have not yet attained a full measure of self-
government., 45  The reference to friendly relations among "nations"
carried no inference of ethnicity or culture; it merely reflected the name
of an organization composed of states.46 This equation of nation and
state is evidenced in Article 1(4), which states that a purpose of the
organization is its serving "as a center for harmonizing the actions of
nations in the attaining of common ends. 47
The principle of self-determination was considered to be
subordinate to the prohibition on the use of force, to the right of
territorial integrity, and to the general commitment of ensuring peace
and security; all of which were regarded as the foundation stones of
the new post-war world order.48 Furthermore, chapters XI and XII of
the U.N. Charter stipulate that self-determination for non-self-
governing and trust territories was to proceed according to a timeline
dictated by colonial administrators; 49 after the adoption of the U.N.
Charter, colonial powers had little incentive to support their colonies'
independence. 50 From 1946 onwards, the U.N. General Assembly
devoted itself to monitoring non-self-governing and trust territories
42. Hannum, supra note 25, at 11. See also U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para. 2, art. 55.
43. U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para. 2. "[T]he French text of the Charter does refer to
respect for the 'right' of self-determination, the 'principe de l'6galit6 de droits des
peuples et leur droit h disposer d'eux-m~mes."' Hannum, supra note 25, at 11 n.40.
44. U.N. CHARTER art. 55.
45. Hannum, supra note 25, at 11; U.N. CHARTER art. 73.
46. Hannum, supra note 25, at 11.
47. U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para. 4; Hannum, supra note 25, at 11.
48. Simpson, supra note 6, at 266.
49. Id. Article 73(b) states that these powers must "develop self-government...
according to the particular circumstances of each territory and its peoples and their
varying stages of advancement." Id.; U.N. CHARTER art. 73(b).
50. Simpson, supra note 6, at 267. Great Britain pledged to "guide colonial
peoples along the road to self-government within the framework of the British empire."
Id. The French made their position clear at the 1944 Brazzaville Conference of Colonial
Administrators: "[t]he aims of the work of civilization accomplished by France in its
colonies exclude all idea of autonomy, all possibility of evolution outside of the French
bloc of the Empire; the eventual establishment, even in the distant future, of self-
government is to be dismissed." Id. Portugal, Spain, Belgium and the Netherlands
pursued variations on both of these colonial philosophies. Even the United States started
to have doubts about this "right" to self-determination for territories within its sphere of
influence. The Soviet Union, while formally upholding the right to self-determination in
its Constitution, denied independence to several nations that became part of the Soviet
"Empire" (Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia) or which became satellite states (Poland, the
former Czechoslovakia, and Hungary). Id. at 267-68..
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and demanding the transmission of information regarding these
territories from the colonial power.
The United Nations' most significant and comprehensive effort towards
defining the principle of self-determination is Resolution 1514 (XV), 5
2
the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Peoples
and Territories, which was proposed by the Soviet Union in 1960 and
adopted by the United Nations on December 14, 1960.53 Considered
by some scholars to be the "Magna Carta" of decolonization,54
Resolution 1514 (XV) declares that "all peoples have a right to self-
determination, 55 thereby abandoning the U.N. Charter's cautious granting
of independence in favor of "a speedy and unconditional end to
colonialism."5 6  Its most radical departure from the U.N. Charter is
contained in Principle Three, which states that "[i]nadequacy of political,
economic, social, or educational preparedness should never serve as a
pretext for delaying independence.,
57
Resolution 1514 (XV) raises some significant points. It does not recognize
a right to representative government and freedom from discrimination
(so-called "internal self-determination").58  Furthermore, only those
territories which have not yet attained independence can rely on the
application of this resolution.59 Additionally, Resolution 1514 (XV) is
subordinate to the international principle of territorial integrity. 60 One
day after it was adopted, the General Assembly adopted Resolution
51. See Edward A. Laing, The Norm of Self-Determination, 1941-1991, 22 CAL.
W. INT'L L.J., 209, 213 (1992). Chapter XI of the U.N., Charter is a Declaration
Regarding Non-Self Governing Territories, the main article of which is Article 73,
whereby states administering non-self-governing territories must furnish the United
Nations with information on a regular basis regarding the territories for which they are
responsible. See Hannum, supra note 25, at 21. One hundred-five territories were
designated as non-self-governing territories. Id. at 73 n.164.
52. G.A. Res. 1514(XV), U.N. GAOR, 15th Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 66, U.N. Doc.
A/4684 (1960).
53. Laing, supra note 51, at 215. The Declaration was accepted by 89 votes to
none, with 9 abstentions. Id. Abstaining were Australia, Belgium, Dominican Republic,
France, Portugal, South Africa, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the United States. D.J.
HARRIS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 117 n.74 (4th ed. 1991).
54. See Simpson, supra note 6, at 269.
55. G.A. Res. 1514(XV) U.N. GAOR, 15th Sess., Supp. No. 16, para. 2, at 67,
U.N. Doc. A/4684 (1960).
56. Id.
57. Id. para. 3, at 67.
58. Simpson, supra note 6, at 270.
59. Id.
60. See discussion infra Part II.B.3.
154 1,61 a cautious restatement of the U.N. Charter chapters dealing with
dependent and trust territories.62 This resolution also instituted guidelines
on transmitting information on non-self-governing territories under
Article 73 of the U.N. Charter.63 However, Resolution 1541 conflicts
with Resolution 1514 (XV) in that it upholds the provisions of the
U.N. Charter which the latter denounces; 64 it does not reiterate the
need for an immediate end to colonialism, but rather provides a
number of alternatives to complete independence that are absent from
the earlier resolution.
65
In November 1961, a seventeen-state committee was formed by the
U.N. General Assembly to make recommendations on the progress and
implementation of Resolution 1514 (XV). 66 This committee was later
expanded to include twenty-four states and accordingly became popularly
known as the Committee of Twenty-Four. This committee performs
most of the monitoring functions over the non-self-governing territories.67
A further milestone in the development of the principle of self-
determination was the Declaration on Principles of International Law
concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance
with the Charter of the United Nations68 (Declaration on Friendly Relations),
61. G.A. Res. 1541, U.N. GAOR, 15th Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 29, U.N. Doc.
A/4651 (1960).
62. See Simpson, supra note 6, at 270 n.80. See also Laing, supra note 51, at 215;
Hannum, supra note 25, at 13.
63. See generally Simpson, supra note 6, at 270 n.80. See also Hannum, supra
note 25, at 13.
64. Simpson, supra note 6, at 270.
65. Id.
66. Laing, supra note 51, at 215.
67. See id.
68. As the title suggests, the Declaration on Friendly Relations addresses a wide
range of issues. Part of the section concerned with self-determination is as follows:
By virtue of the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples
enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations, all peoples have the right freely
to determine, without external interference, their political status and to pursue
their economic, social and cultural development, and every State has the duty
to respect this right in accordance with the provisions of the Charter.
Every State has the duty to promote, through joint and separate action,
realization of the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, in
accordance with the provisions of the Charter, and to render assistance to the
United Nations in carrying out the responsibilities entrusted to it by the Charter
regarding the implementation of the principles ....
The establishment of a sovereign and independent State, the free
association or integration with an independent State or the emergence into any
other political status freely determined by a people constitute modes of
implementing the right to self-determination by that people.
Every State has the duty to refrain from any forcible action which deprives
peoples referred to above in the elaboration of the present principle of their
right to self-determination and freedom and independence. In their actions
[VoL. 4: 339, 2003] The Rock and the Bailiwick
SAN DIEGO INT'L L.J.
adopted by consensus in 1970.69 As the most recent major resolution on
the principle of self-determination, it represents the highest development
of U.N. law yet. 70 "It is no overstatement to say that the elaboration of
the principle of self-determination in the 1970 Declaration provides the
cornerstone of the United Nations approach to the concept. '"71 Following
previous U.N. Declarations, the Declaration on Friendly Relations also
makes the principle of self-determination subordinate to the concept of
72territorial integrity. However, this restriction only applies to states that
have a government representing a territory's entire population without
distinction as to race, creed, or color.73
2. Post-Decolonization
Whereas the Declaration of Friendly Relations was adopted within a
political context, it also reflected the promotion of the principle of self-
determination as a human right in other U.N. forums.74 On the same day
that the General Assembly adopted the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights in 1948, the General Assembly requested the Commission on
Human Rights to "continue to give priority in its work to the preparation
of a draft Covenant on Human Rights and draft measures of
implementation.,, 75 This commission's work eventually resulted in the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, both of which were
adopted in 1966 and entered into force in 1976. Ratified by over 110
countries, Article 176 of both Covenants77 contains the most universally
against, and resistance to, such forcible action in pursuit of the exercise of their
right to self-determination, such peoples are entitled to seek and to receive
support in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter.
G.A. Res. 2625, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, at 123-24, U.N. Doc
A/8028 (1970).
69. See generally Simpson, supra note 6, at 270; Hanauer, supra note 2, at 144;
Hannum, supra note 25, at 14; Thomas M. Franck, Editorial Comment, Dulce et
Decorum Est: The Strategic Role of Legal Principles in the Falklands War, 77 AM. J.
INT'L L. 109, 115-16 (1983).
70. Simpson, supra note 6, at 271.
71. Robin C. A. White, Self-Determination: Time for a Reassessment?, 28 NETH.
INT'L L. REV. 147 (1981).
72. See Hannum, supra note 25, at 16.
73. Id. at 17. See also Simpson, supra note 6, at 27 1.
74. See generally Hannum, supra note 25, at 17; Shaw, supra note 29, at 174-75.
75. G.A. Res. 217, U.N. GAOR, 5th Sess., 183d mtg., at 79, para. E, U.N. Doc.
A/810 (1948).
76. Article I of both Covenants reads as follows:
binding statement of the right of self-determination. However,
both Covenants are unclear as to which "peoples" this right to self-
determination applies and whether "peoples" must be distinguished from
states or individuals.7 8
3. Historic Title
It is undeniable that a claim for self-determination challenges the
internationally recognized principle of territorial sovereignty.79
Territorial claims based on historic title arise when a state claims that a
particular territory that belonged to it in the past should be returned,
thereby negating the inhabitants' right to self-determination. 80 As legal
justification for their claim, claimant states refer to paragraph 6 of
Resolution 1514 (XV) which states, "[a]ny attempt aimed at the partial
or total disruption of the national unity and the territorial integrity of a
country is incompatible with the purposes and principles of the Charter
of the United Nations." 81 It has been argued that this paragraph applies
to situations where the territorial integrity of a state was disrupted due to
1. All peoples have the right to self-determination. By virtue of that right
they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic,
social and cultural development.
2. All peoples may, for their own ends, freely dispose of their natural
wealth and resources without prejudice to any obligations arising out of
international economic co-operation, based upon the principle of mutual
benefit, and international law. In no case may a people be deprived of its own
means of subsistence.
3. The States Parties to the present Covenant, including those having
responsibility for the administration of Non-Self-Governing and Trust
Territories, shall promote the realization of the right to self-determination, and
shall respect that right, in conformity with the provisions of the Charter of the
United Nations.
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, adopted Dec. 16, 1966,
993 U.N.T.S. 3; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted Dec. 19,
1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171.
77. Hannum, supra note 25, at 18. During the debates leading up to the adoption
of the Covenants, there was opposition of the inclusion of a right to self-determination
by the European States. See Simpson, supra note 6, at 268. They argued that inclusion
as a right was premature since self-determination was merely a principle. Id. at 268-69.
However, the Afro-Asian bloc successfully argued that self-determination was the most
important human right and should supersede the enjoyment of all other rights. Id. at 269.
78. See Simpson, supra note 6, at 268.
79. See THOMAS D. MUSGRAVE, SELF-DETERMINATION AND NATIONAL MINORITIES
239 (1997).
80. Id. "'Historic Title' forms the basis of claims by Ireland to Northern Ireland,
Japan to the Southern Kurile Islands .... Togo to British Togoland which was annexed
to Ghana, Spain to Gibraltar," Argentina to the Falkland Islands. See Franck, supra note
69, at 118.
81. G.A. Res. 1514(XV). U.N. GAOR, 15th Sess., Supp. No. 16, para. 6 at 67,
U.N. Doc A/4684, (1960). See also MUSGRAVE, supra note 79, at 239.
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war or colonization; a return of the territory would restore the state to its
historical boundaries.82 Consequently, the inhabitants of a territory subject
to a claim of historic title are precluded from exercising their right to
self-determination because the only status available to them is
annexation to the claimant state. 83 This means that although paragraph 2
of Resolution 1514 (XV) declares a right to self-determination to all
peoples, the application of this right is prevented by the existence of an
historic title.84
During the negotiations leading to the acceptance of Resolution 1514
(XV), this interpretation was rejected by several states. Most states
voting for paragraph 6 of Resolution 1514 (XV) did so in the
understanding that the right of self-determination was granted to
colonies but was not extended to parts of decolonized states. 85
Although this interpretation seems to be more literally accurate,86 other
countries accepted the opposite interpretation87 whereby the historic
claim preempts the right to self-determination.
88
82. See generally MUSGRAVE, supra note 79, at 239; S.K.N. Blay, Self-
Determination versus Territorial Integrity in Decolonization, 18 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. &
POL. 441,443-44 (1986).
83. See MUSGRAVE, supra note 79, at 239.
84. See generally id. at 239-40; Blay, supra note 82, at 444-45.
85. Thomas M. Franck & Paul Hoffman, The Right of Self-Determination in
Very Small Places, 8 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 331, 370 (1975). This was the position
of the United Kingdom. MUSGRAVE, supra note 79, at 240. The British delegation to
the United Nations pointed out that the word "attempt" in paragraph 6 indicates future
action and thus cannot be used to redress historic territorial claims. Id. Therefore, "its
aim is ... to protect 'colonial territories or countries which have recently become
independent against attempts to divide them ... at a time when they are least able to
defend themselves."' Id.
86. MUSGRAVE, supra note 79, at 240. See also Blay, supra note 82, at 444;
Franck & Hoffman, supra note 85, at 370.
87. MUSGRAVE, supra note 79, at 240. These other countries are Indonesia,
Guatemala, Iran, Afghanistan, and Morocco. Id.
88. See id. During the drafting of Resolution 1514 (XV), Guatemala requested the
inclusion of a sentence to paragraph 2 so that the right of self-determination would not
"impair the right of territorial integrity of any state or its right to the recovery of
territory." Id. This proposal was withdrawn before it could be put to vote. Id. "Jordan,
for example, believed that '[t]he usurpation of a part of the Arab territory of Palestine by
the joint aggression of colonialism and Zionism' constituted an example ... where the[historic claim] take[s precedence] over [the right] to self-determination." Franck &
Hoffman, supra note 85, at 370 (citation omitted). "Similarly, Indonesia [considered]
paragraph 6 as an invitation for the absorption of the Dutch colony of Western New
Guinea regardless of the preferences of the inhabitants." Id. In addition, Morocco
indicated that it considered paragraph 6 as a counteraction to the "'silent tactics of the
viper-of French colonialism-to partition Morocco and disrupt its national unity, by
Two judicial opinions of the International Court of Justice (ICJ)
elaborated on the relationship between the right to self-determination
and historic title. In the 1971 Advisory Opinion on the Legal Consequences
for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia
(Namibia),8 9 the ICJ held that "the subsequent development of international
law in regard to non-self-governing territories, as enshrined in the
Charter of the United Nations, made the principle of self-determination
available to all [nations]." 90 Judge Amoun, in a separate opinion, elaborated
on Resolution 1514 (XV) by focusing on the development of international
law through the U.N. Charter and the Resolutions thereunder. 91 Whereas
the ICJ considered the right to self-determination to be a rule of internal
U.N. law, Judge Amoun seems to construct this right as part of international
customary law.
92
Four years after Namibia, the ICJ reaffirmed its position in the 1975
Western Sahara case (Western Sahara), the so-called "sleeping dogs of
historic title" case.93 The ICJ was asked to determine, in an advisory opinion,
the legal ties between the Western Sahara with respectively Morocco
and Mauritania.94 Both claimant states based their claim on an historic
title.95 In its opinion, the ICJ held that there were no "legal ties of such a
nature as might affect the application of Resolution 1514 (XV) in the
decolonization of Western Sahara and, in particular, of the principle of
self-determination through the free and genuine expression of the will of
the peoples of the territory." 96 Although the ICJ did not take a position
on the relationship between the right to self-determination and historic
title, the individual opinions of the judges indicated a clear preference
for the subordinance of historic title to the right to self-determination. 97
In his separate opinion, Judge Dillard declared:
setting up an artificial State in the area of Southern Morocco which the colonialists call
Mauritania."' Id. (citation omitted).
89. Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in
Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276
(1970), 1971 I.C.J. 16 (Jan. 26) [hereinafter Namibia]. After the First World War,
Namibia, the former German South West Africa, was administered as a mandate by
South Africa which refused to place the territory under a trusteeship after the Second
World War. See id.
90. Id. at31.
91. See id. at 74 (Amoun, J., separate opinion).
92. Laing, supra note 51, at 224.
93. See Isaac Dore et al., Self-Determination: The Cases of Fiji, New Caledonia,
Namibia, and the Western Sahara, 82 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. 429, 439 (1990) for a detailed
outline of the facts of the case and developments after the ICJ's Advisory Opinion.
94. Western Sahara (1975), 1975 I.C.J. 12, 14 (Oct. 16) [hereinafter Western Sahara].
95. See generally id.
96. Id. at 68.
97. MUSGRAVE, supra note 79, at 241. See also Laing, supra note 51, at 224.
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[i]t is for the people to determine the destiny of the territory and not the territory
the destiny of the people. Viewed in this perspective it becomes almost self-
evident that the existence of ancient 'legal ties' of the kind described in the
Opinion, while they may influence some of the projected procedures for
decolonization, can have only a tangential effect in the ultimate choices
available to the people.98
Some international legal scholars have also expressed the importance
of the right of self-determination over historic claims, stating, for
example, "[g]enerally, neighboring states have not been allowed to help
themselves to adjacent territories on the basis of historical claims;
boundary readjustments must come as an expression of the democratically
expressed will of those subject to the readjustment." 99 Taking a different
position "would lead to endless conflicts, as modem states [find] themselves
under pressure to join a general reversionary march backward to a status
quo ante of uncertain age and validity."'' 1
The practices of the U.N. General Assembly indicate a willingness to
support self-determination at the cost of historic title.10' In the cases of
West Ifian, East Timor, and Belize, the U.N. General Assembly upheld
the right to self-determination of the inhabitants of the territory over
98. Western Sahara, supra note 94, at 122 (Dillard, J., separate opinion). Judge
Nagendra Singh stated:
the consultation of the people of the territory awaiting decolonization is an
inescapable imperative whether the method followed on decolonization is
integration or association or independence .... Thus even if integration of
territory was demanded by an interested State, as in this case, it could not be
had without ascertaining the freely expressed will of the people-the very sine
qua non of all decolonization.
Id. at 81 (Singh, J., declaration). Likewise Judge De Castro argued that the ties of a
claimant state to a former territory are subject to intertemporal changes in the law.
Therefore, the current law relating to self-determination would supersede ties which may
have existed under a previous regime of international law. See id. at 169 (De Castro, J.,
separate opinion). Under this current law "the administering Power ... has a duty to
recognize the principle that the interests of the inhabitants of the territory are
paramount." Id.
99. Thomas M. Franck, The Stealing of the Sahara, 70 AM. J. INT'L L. 694, 697-98
(1976). But cf. Seokwoo Lee, Continuing Relevance of Traditional Modes of Territorial
Acquisition in International Law and a Modest Proposal, 16 CONN. J. INT'L L. 1, 19 (2000).
100. Franck, supra note 99, at 698. A contrary opinion is supported by J. Robert
Maguire, who argues that, in appropriate circumstances, "a strong historical claim
overrides the right of an indigenous population to self-determination even though the
claim is centuries old." J. Robert Maguire, Note, The Decolonization of Belize: Self-
Determination v. Territorial Integrity, 22 VA. J. INT'L L. 849, 871 (1982). Similarly,
"[a] weak claim will not affect the right of self-determination no matter how recently the
claim arose." Id. at 871-872. However, this argument seems to be incorrect because it
is inconsistent with the actual case law.
101. See Blay, supra note 82, at 450.
claims of historic title aid indicated that the wishes of the people take
precedence in the disposition of their territories.'° 2
4. Limits to the Principle of Self-Determination
Over the years, the principle of self-determination has acquired different
meanings and interpretations. Resolution 1514 (XV), the Declaration on
Friendly Relations, and the two previously-discussed international Covenants
all state that all peoples have the right to self-determination. However,
nowhere is it defined what constitutes a "proper self-determining 'unit'.",°3
Traditionally, the right to self-determination of peoples exists in two
parts:' °4 1) internal self-determination, which identifies "a people's
pursuit of its political, economic, social, and cultural development within
the framework of an existing state;"'' 0 5 and, 2) external self-determination,
which "entitles a people to decide its international identity and to be free
from foreign interference."'10 6 The meaning attributed to self-determination
will in each case be determined by the identity of the "peoples" invoking
the right. 10 7 In its first phase, between the World Wars, self-determination
focused on legitimizing the break-up of empires and consequently vested
in "ethnic communities, nations or nationalities primarily defined by
language or culture."108 In the second phase, the post-Second World
War phase, self-determination was characterized by its anti-colonialist
interpretation. 0 9  And in the third phase, post-colonial phase, self-
determination was interpreted as "a certain entitlement of segments of
the population of independent, non-racist states."" 0  More recently, the
Declaration on the Rights of Persons belonging to National or Ethnic,
Religious and Linguistic Minorities has defined peoples with a claim to self-
determination as "national or ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities."' '
102. Id.
103. Chen, supra note 3, at 1290.
104. Johan D. van der Vyver, Self-Determination of the Peoples of Quebec Under
International Law, 10 J. TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y 1, 11-12 (2000); Kolodner, supra note
19, at 159.
105. Van der Vyver, supra note 104, at 11 (citation omitted).
106. Kolodner, supra note 19, at 159 (citation omitted).
107. Van der Vyver, supra note 104, at 14.
108. See id. at 15 (citation omitted).
109. Id. at 16. By extension, self-determination was held to apply to peoples
subject to racist regimes. See id. South Africa claimed that the establishment of its tribal
homelands as part of the apartheid regime constituted a manifestation of the right to self-
determination of the different ethnic groups within the country's population. Id. at 16-
17. The international community- responded that the tribal homelands did not emerge
from the wishes of the people but were merely a creation of the white regime. Id. at 17.
110. Id. at17.
111. G.A. Res. 47/135, art. 2, para. 1 (Dec. 18, 1992), available at http://www.un.
org/documents/ga/res/47/a47r135.htm (last visited Oct. 23, 2002).
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Thus, "[r]eligious, ethnic, and cultural minorities have come to be recognized
in... international law as "peoples" [with] a right to self-determination. '' 12
Four different components to self-determination can be distinguished
depending on the identity of the "peoples" claiming self-determination.
During the inter-war period, self-determination was used to
disintegrate empires; "peoples" were seen as territoriality defined
nations asserting political independence." 3 The definition shifted to
colonized people asserting independence from colonial rule following
the Second World War, and in the 1960s, a new category emerged:
peoples subject to racist regimes who were demanding participation in
the government of their countries.114  Finally, the right to self-
determination has extended to include national or ethnic, cultural,
religious, and linguistic minorities who want to live according to the
traditions and customs of their group.
15
It should be noted that the right to self-determination does not include
a right to secession. The claim to self-determination by one group necessarily
conflicts with another group's claim to territorial integrity." 6 Although,
as of yet, secession is not recognized as a right under international law,
international law does not prohibit secession." 7 As stated in the Declaration
on Friendly Relations, secession may be lawful if the decision is "freely
determined by a people." 118 The existence of a new state will also be
accepted if, as a consequence of an armed conflict, distinct territories of
an existing state should agree to secede under the terms of a peace
treaty.1 9 Gerry Simpson claims that "[r]ecent developments lend credence
to the idea that a new post-colonial right to limited secession may be on
the point of crystallizing.''
20
112. Van der Vyver, supra note 104, at 14. See also Kelly, supra note 8, at 218.
113. Van der Vyver, supra note 104, at 21.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. See Hannum, supra note 25, at 41.
117. Id. at 42. See also Frederic L. Kirgis, Jr., Comment, The Degrees of Self-
Determination in the United Nations Era, 88 AM. J. INT'L. L. 304, 307 (1994).
118. G.A. Res. 2625, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, at 123-24, U.N. Doc
A/8028 (1970). Examples are the reunification of Germany, and the disintegration of
both the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia. See van der Vyver, supra note 104, at 26.
119. Van der Vyver, supra note 104, at 26; CASSESSE, supra note 27, at 359-63. An
example of this rule is the secession of Eritrea from Ethiopia. Van der Vyver, supra note
104, at 26.
120. Simpson, supra note 6, at 284. Simpson refers to the U.N. sanctioned intervention
on behalf of the Kurds in May 1991. This humanitarian intervention was justified on the
grounds that the Kurds in Northern Iraq were suffering massive human rights
The concept of self-determination has been in constant evolution
throughout its history. That the principle of self-determination does not
yet recognize a right to secession, except in the two extreme circumstances
mentioned above, anticipates another change in its definition.12 1
C. Microstates
The acceleration of decolonization after the Second World War
resulted in the emergence of numerous microstates.12  This trend caused
international concern about the viability and desirability of these new
microstates. 123 Microstates are defined as "exceptionally small nations
whose 'independence' is generally acknowledged, although it is in fact
seriously limited by the political and economic facts of international
life."' 124  Hector Gross Espiell, a Special Rapporteur for the U.N.
Commission on Human Rights, found that diminutiveness itself does not
prevent self-determination of these small states, but that several other
factors had to be taken into account as well. 125 These factors include: 1)
the possibility that these small states might succumb to external
influence; 2) that resource-poor States could not discharge their U.N.
duties; and, 3) the fragmentation into small nations could endanger
stability in the international community. 2 6 These international concerns
about the emergence of microstates stem from the debate over admission
of the Maldives to the United Nations in 1965.127 As a consequence, a
U.N. Committee was established in 1969 to investigate the possibility of
alternative membership for very small countries. 128 Although this
Committee produced an Interim Report in June 1970, no official action
was ever taken to establish a special membership category.1
29
deprivations causing a flood of refugees into Turkey. This threat to the Kurds' peace
will remain as long as they are denied their self-determination. Id.
121. See Hannum, supra note 25, at 67.
122. Chen, supra note 3, at 1292.
123. Id.
124. Daniel Orlow, Comment, Of Nations Small: The Small State in International
Law, 9 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 115, 119 (1995) (quoting PATRICIA WOHLGEMUTH
BLAIR, THE MINISTATE DILEMMA 2 (1967)).
125. See Thomas D. Grant, Between Diversity and Disorder: A Review of Jorri C.
Duursma, Fragmentation and the International Relations of Micro-States: Self-Determination
and Statehood, 12 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 629, 633 (1997) (book review).
126. Id.
127. Id. at 656.
128. Id. at 657.
129. Id. However, the Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO)
and the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) amended their constitutions to admit
non-self-governing territories. In the 1990s, seven small entities were admitted
membership to the United Nations: Liechtenstein (Sept. 18, 1990), Micronesia (Sept. 17,
1991), the Marshall Islands (Sept. 17, 1991), San Marino (Mar. 2, 1992), Monaco (May
28, 1993), Andorra (July 28, 1993), and Palau (Dec. 15, 1994). Id.
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Even if microstates represent the culmination of the right to self-
determination, they 0 practically cannot survive unless they are
economically viable.'3 "A state without a basis for a sustainable economy
cannot long exist."' 3'1 This concern was originally expressed by United
States U.N. Ambassador Goldberg in 1966 when he said: "[i]t was not
anticipated, nor do I believe, would it have been accepted in 1945 that
the United Nations be extended to include tiny states whose only
justification for existence is that their territory is no longer wanted by
the colonial governments that for years supported them."' 32 Microstates,




1. The Demise of the Principle of Self-Determination?
Some commentators have asserted that because the era of decolonization
has come to an end, the principle of self-determination has outlived its
usefulness and should be relocated to the historical dustbin. 34 They
claim that support for these self-determination movements will lead to
violent conflicts that will threaten the stability of a region or even the
entire world community. 131
According to Eric Kolodner, such perspective is misguided for two
reasons: 1) it ignores the legitimate human rights claims of people; and,
2) it perpetuates domestic and international conflict. 136 Although the era
of decolonization has officially ended, many peoples still are suppressed
under neo-colonial rule.137 Only the international community's support
for their self-determination claims can guarantee human rights and
130. See Kelly, supra note 8, at 274.
13 I. Id. A recent example would be the case of the Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh.
Without any viable economy, the only thing holding the self-styled republic together is
the shared ethnicity of the Armenian people. Id.
132. Orlow, supra note 124, at 125 (citation omitted).
133. Id. (citation omitted).
134. Kolodner, supra note 19, at 153-54. See generally Amitai Etzioni, The Evils
of Self-Determination, 89 FOREIGN POL'Y 21 (1992).
135. See Etzioni, supra note 134, at 21.
136. Kolodner, supra note 19, at 157.
137. See Chen, supra note 3, at 1296. Those currently claiming self-determination
include Palestinians, Kurds, Tamils, Tibetans, the Scots, Roman Catholics in Northern
Ireland, Catalans and Basques in Spain, and the French Canadians in Quebec. See id.
dignity for these peoples. 38 Furthermore, the serious consequences of
the international community's failure to support claims for self-
determination are clearly demonstrated in Somalia and in the former
Yugoslavia. Therefore, Kolodner argues for a readjustment of the content
of the principle of self-determination by the international community in
order to address the changing needs of a post-Cold War world rather
than abandoning the principle altogether. 139
2. Self-Determination as Customary Law
Over the years, self-determination has attained the status of a "right"
through customary international law. 40 The only documents that refer
to self-determination as a right and create legally binding obligations are
the U.N. Charter, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights, and the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights.' 4' These documents act as sources of positive law under Article
38(l)(a) of the ICJ Statute. 42 However, because these treaties do not
define the concept of self-determination, no legal obligation exists. 43
Individual U.N. General Assembly resolutions defining the content of
self-determination carry only moral force and do not generate legally
binding obligations.
144
138. See generally id. at 1295-96.
139. Kolodner, supra note 19, at 154. Some eloquent political commentators, such
as William Safire, even endorsed the evolution of a right to self-determination for
ethnically repressed peoples:
The Clinton Administration, facing the prospect of television coverage of tens
of thousands of freezing [Kosovar] refugees, will ultimately [act militarily] ....
That's what happened after "our" victory over Saddam Hussein. Only when
we saw the televised human tragedy of the Kurdish people ... did we create a
sanctuary for them in northern Iraq .... limiting Iraq's sovereignty in that "no-
flight zone."
Thus, .. . a new policy is being backed into by the Western world: if enough
civilian lives are in danger of starvation or massacre, and if intervention by
airpower can make a difference and if the U.S. takes the lead then an alliance of
nations will reluctantly act to impose a temporary, defacto self-determination.
Needed now is a new policy of evolutionary self-determination that time can
advance or modify. Some leader must formulate and sell a new form of shared
sovereignty, a tertium quid to accommodate insurgencies and defuse ethnic
conflict not just in Kosovo, but in other lands where there can be no clear
winner-from Iraq to East Timor and the West Bank.
History awaits that newly practical and more sophisticated Wilson ....
William Safire, Woodrow Wilson Lives, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 1998, at A17.
140. See Benedict Kingsbury, Self-Determination and "Indigenous Peoples", 86
AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. 369, 383 (1992).
141. See Hanauer, supra note 2, at 151.
142. Id.
143. See id. at 151-52.
144. See U.N. CHARTER art. 10.
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Collectively viewed, these instruments, together with years of evolving
state practice, have created a set of norms regarding the principle of self-
determination, which have achieved the status of customary international
law as defined by Article 38(1)(b) of the ICJ Statute as a "general
practice accepted by law."' 145 Consequently, in its Advisory Opinion in
Nanibia, the ICJ declared that Resolutions 1514, 1541, 2625, and others
representing "the subsequent development of international law in regard
to non-self-governing territories, as enshrined in the Charter of the
United Nations, made the principle of self-determination applicable to
all of them."' 146 Unanimously adopted, Resolution 1514 (XV) makes the
strongest contribution that self-determination has become part of
international customary law. 1
47
The right to self-determination has been supported by state practice;
over seventy territories and former colonies have been decolonized since
1946, with many of them becoming sovereign states and members of the
United Nations. 48 Furthermore, governments and international scholars
accept the right of peoples to self-determination. 149 And although it is
debatable whether self-determination has become a jus cogens, it has
undoubtedly achieved the status of customary international law.5 0
145. Hanauer, supra note 2, at 152. See also Kirgis, supra note 117, at 305; Shaw,
supra note 29, at 175; Deborah Z. Cass, Re-Thinking Self-Determination: A Critical
Analysis of Current International Law Theories, 18 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 21,
26(1992).
146. Namibia, supra note 89, at 31. Justice Dillard reiterated this sentiment in
Western Sahara stating:
the cumulative impact of many resolutions when similar in content, voted for
by overwhelming majorities and frequently repeated over a period of time may
give rise to a general opinio juris and thus constitute a norm of customary
international law .... [T]his is the precise situation manifested by the long list
of resolutions which, following in the wake of resolution 1514 (XV), have
proclaimed the principle of self-determination to be an operative right in the
decolonization of non-self governing territories.
Western Sahara, supra note 94, at 121 (Dillard, J., separate opinion).
147. See Hanauer, supra note 2, at 153. The U.N. Office of Legal Affairs has stated:
in view of the greater solemnity and significance of a declaration, it may be
considered to impart, on behalf of the organ adopting it, a strong expectation
that Members of the international community will abide by it. Consequently,
in so far as the expectation is gradually justified by State practice, a declaration
may by custom become recognized as laying down rules binding upon States.
Id. (citation omitted).
148. Id.
149. See Hannum, supra note 25, at 31.
150. Id.
3. Self-Determination as a Right to a Democratic Form of Government
Thomas Franck alleges that there is a "transformation of the democratic
entitlement from moral prescription to international legal obligation"'
' 5
'
and that self-determination can be achieved through this evolving right
to a democratic government. 15 However, it is doubtful that a
democratic government alone can satisfy minorities' urges for self-
determination, let alone preserve their cultural identities. 
53
III. THE CASE OF GIBRALTAR
A. Introduction
For nearly 300 years Great Britain has ruled Gibraltar using it as a
symbol of its naval strength. 154 Prior to British rule, sovereignty over
Gibraltar alternated between the Moors and the Spaniards, with Spain
finally controlling the territory from 1462 to 1704.11 After the British
invaded in 1704, sovereignty over Gibraltar was transferred to Britain by
the Treaty of Peace and Friendship signed between Great Britain and
Spain (Treaty of Utrecht) in 1713.156
Gibraltar is a narrow peninsula off Spain's southern Mediterranean
coast, just northeast of the Strait of Gibraltar. Connected to the Spanish
mainland by a sandy isthmus, it is three miles long and three-fourths of a
mile wide. 5 7 Its name is derived from Jabal Tariq in Arabic, after Tariq
ibn Ziyad, who captured the peninsula in 711 A.D.;158 together with
Mount Hacho, on the African coast opposite, it is one of the Pillars of
Hercules, 59 which identified the western limits of navigation for the
ancient world. 160 Commonly referred to as "the Rock", Gibraltar has
personified the British naval strength since the eighteenth century.'
6
'
Most of its inhabitants are of mixed Genoese, British, Spanish, Maltese,
and Portuguese descent, and only Gibraltarians are allowed to live on the
151. Thomas M. Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, 86 AM. J.
INT'L L. 46, 47 (1992).
152. Simpson, supra note 6, at 279.
153. See id. at 279-80.
154. See Gibraltar, 5 THE NEW ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 253 (15th ed. 1998).
See also KEYLOR, supra note 26, at 9.
155. Simon J. Lincoln, Note, The Legal Status of Gibraltar: Whose Rock is it
Anyway?, 18 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 285, 286 (1994).
156. Id.





[VOL. 4: 339, 2003] The Rock and the Bailiwick
SAN DIEGO INT'L L.J.
Rock, all others must acquire residence permits. 162 Although the Rock is
"physically Mediterranean, with... pavement cafes and summer heat,...
the trappings of genteel Britishness are everywhere." 163 Basing its claim on
its right to territorial integrity, Spain is demanding the return of the
peninsula, whereas, Great Britain insists that the Treaty of Utrecht instituted
British sovereignty over Gibraltar thereby ceasing all Spanish claims. 64
B. History of the Anglo-Spanish Dispute
1. Pre-1713
Under the direction of Tariq ibn Zeyad, the Moors conquered the
peninsula in 711 A.D., which was thereafter held as a fortress by
successive Muslim rulers until 1462, when Gibraltar was annexed to the
Spanish Kingdom of Castille. 65 The Rock "remained under Spanish
control until a joint Anglo-Dutch fleet seized the town during the War of
the Spanish Succession."' 66 To show their support of the newly crowned
Spanish king-King Philip V-most of the inhabitants walked out of
Gibraltar and settled in the neighboring town of San Roque.
167
Hostilities between Great Britain and Spain ended with the peace treaty
signed in the Dutch town of Utrecht on July 13, 1713.
2. Treaty of Utrecht-1 713
Article X of the Treaty of Utrecht declared that the Spanish king
would "yield to the crown of Great Britain the full and entire propriety
of the town and the castle of Gibraltar, together with the port,
162. Id.
163. Justin Webb, Gibraltar eyes uncertain future, BBC NEWS, Nov. 20, 2001, at
http://www.news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/world/from-our own-correspondent/1657790.stm 9last
visited Sept. 30, 2002). "The roadsigns, the bobbies on the beat, the Marks and Spencers, the
gentle tolling of the church bells, the ringing tones of the telephones, the fact that
everyone wears knee breeches and morris dancing is compulsory on Tuesdays. Yes, I
made those last bits up. But only just." Id.
164. See Lincoln, supra note 155, at 286-87.
165. Gibraltar, supra note 154, at 253; Lincoln, supra note 155, at 291.
166. Lincoln, supra note 155, at 291. In 1701, after the crowning of Philip of Anjou,
grandson of King Louis XIV of France, as Philip V, King of Spain, the British feared that
he might form an alliance between France and Spain. Id. at 291 n.44. At the time,
Archduke Charles of Austria, the son of the Holy Roman Emperor Leopold I, also made a
claim for the Spanish throne. Id. "The War of the Spanish Succession [started] when Great
Britain declared war against France and Spain on May 4, 1702." Id. at 292 n.44.
167. Id. at 292.
fortifications, and forts Ithereunto belonging[J' ' 168  This same first
paragraph further stipulates that Spain "gives up said propriety to be
held and enjoyed absolutely with all manner of right for ever, without
any exception or impediment whatsoever. ' 69 In exchange for this
propriety, Great Britain promised in the final paragraph of Article X if
it decided to alienate Gibraltar, "the preference of having the same
shall always be given to the crown of Spain before any others. 17°
Although both parties signed the peace treaty, they were soon at odds
as to the interpretation of the term "propriety.' 7' According to the
British, the term referred to the land and everything on the land within
the city and fortifications of Gibraltar. l7 2 Under Spanish civil law, a
propriety merely gives its owner something similar to a right of
possession but does not bestow any full sovereign rights.
173
3. Post-1713
a. The Committee of Twenty-Four
Because Great Britain registered Gibraltar as a non-self-governing
territory under the provisions of Chapter XI of the U.N. Charter, it is
obliged to provide the United Nations with annual reports on the
colony. 174 Created by the General Assembly in 1963, the Committee of
Twenty-Four was charged with monitoring the implementation of
Resolution 1514 (XV), which outlined the principles under which
colonial powers were to free their colonies from colonial rule. 175 As
Gibraltar is considered a British colony, Spain requested the Committee
of Twenty-Four to analyze the Gibraltar situation under the terms of
Resolution 1514 (XV) in 1963.176 Its investigation took two years
during which Spanish, British, and Gibraltarian delegations were heard,
and a consensus was reached which structured negotiations for the future
status of Gibraltar. 177 This consensus was silent as to Gibraltar's right to
self-determination and only requested both parties to bear in mind the
interests of the people of Gibraltar. 178
168. Treaty of Peace and Friendship between Great Britain and Spain, July 13,
1713, Gr. Brit.-Spain, 28 CONSOL. T.S. 295, 330 [hereinafter Treaty of Utrecht].
169. Id. at 331.
170. Id.
171. See Lincoln, supra note 155, at 293-94.
172. Id. at 292 n.50.
173. Id.
174. U.N. CHARTER art. 73(e).
175. See discussion supra Part II.B.L.b
176. See Lincoln, supra note 155, at 294-95.
177. Id. at 295.
178. Id. at 295-96.
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b. Resolutions 2231 & 2353
In 1966, the U.N. General Assembly passed Resolution 2231, which
called upon both Spain and Great Britain to negotiate the future status of
Gibraltar and to report back to the Committee of Twenty-Four. 179 Great
Britain, acting in accordance with what it believed its responsibilities
were under Resolution 2231, held a referendum in Gibraltar enabling the
people to decide whether to join Spain or to retain their links to
Britain.' 80 The referendum, which took place on September 10, 1967,
showed an overwhelming support for Britain-out of 12,182 votes cast,
12,138 supported British rule, whereas a mere forty-four voted in
support for annexation to Spain.' 8' In response to the results of the
referendum, Great Britain adopted the Gibraltar Constitution, which
"effectively gave the people of Gibraltar the power to veto any decision
regarding the transfer of sovereignty from the British Crown to another
state." 1 82 However, on September 1, 1967, prior to the referendum, the
Committee of Twenty-Four stated that the referendum would contradict
the provisions of Resolution 2231; a position adopted by the U.N.
General Assembly three months later.' 83
Resolution 2353, adopted by the U.N. General Assembly in December
1967, as a response to the invalid plebiscite, resolutely subordinated the
claim to self-determination to the territorial claim of Spain. 84 Because
179. Id. at 296.
180. See Franck & Hoffman, supra note 85, at 373. Prior to holding its referendum,
Britain informed Spain that it had given independence to 700 million people in the past
twenty years, while Spain had maintained its colonies; and, Britain would apply the same
principles as it has applied in its other decolonizations. Id. at 372.
181. Id. at 373. Commonwealth advisors, at the invitation of the British government,
stated that they were impressed with the fair and proper manner the secret ballot process
was conducted. Id.
182. Lincoln, supra note 155, at 297-98. The preamble of the Gibraltar Constitution
reads as follows:
Whereas Gibraltar is part of Her majesty's dominions and Her Majesty's Government
have given assurances to the people of Gibraltar that Gibraltar will remain part
of Her Majesty's dominions unless and until an Act of Parliament otherwise
provides and furthermore that Her Majesty's Government will never enter into
arrangements under which the people of Gibraltar would pass under the sovereignty
of another state against their freely and democratically expressed wishes.
GIB. CONST. pmbl.
183. See History, at http://www.gibraltar.gov.gi/political-development/pol-dev_
index.htm (last visited Sept. 30, 2002).
184. See MUSGRAVE, supra note 79, at 247. "[T]he General Assembly [noted] that
250 years of [in]habitation was insufficient to establish the indigenous character of
[Gibraltar's] inhabitants." Id. at 251.
in its preamble Resolution 2353 applied paragraph 6 of Resolution 1514
to Gibraltar, the U.N. General Assembly for the first time declared that
consulting the people of a territory about their own wishes violates
paragraph 6.185 In response to the referendum and the adoption of the
Gibraltar Constitution, the Spanish Government imposed a virtual
complete ban on movement of persons and goods between Gibraltar and
the Spanish mainland in June 1969.186
c. Anglo-Spanish Agreements to Negotiate Sovereignty Issues
To resolve their dispute over Gibraltar, Spain and Great Britain signed
the Lisbon Agreement on April 10, 1980, stipulating that negotiations
between both parties will be pursued in accordance with the relevant
U.N. resolutions.' 87 On November 1987, these negotiations resulted in
the Brussels Agreement, which declared that to achieve implementation
of the Lisbon Agreement, an open border between Spain and Gibraltar
would be established and further negotiations on the issue of sovereignty
would be held.
88
Ten years after the Brussels Agreement was signed, Spain submitted a
proposal to institute joint sovereignty over Gibraltar for at least fifty
years between Spain and Great Britain, followed by autonomy within the
Spanish kingdom. 189 This proposal was rejected by Great Britain and
talks were broken off. Beginning in 2001, both parties agreed to another
round of negotiations with a final agreement by May 19, 2002.190
185. Franck & Hoffman, supra note 85, at 374. See also MUSGRAVE, supra note 79,
at 247; HARRIS, supra note 53, at 124.
186. Lincoln, supra note 155, at 298; Franck & Hoffman, supra note 85, at 374.
187. Lincoln, supra note 155, at 299.
188. Id. at 300.
189. Spain and Britain agree Gibraltar talks, BBC NEWS, July 26, 2001, at
http://news.bbc.co.uk.1/hi/world/europe/1457652.stm (last visited Sept. 26, 2002).
190. Id. However, this date may have been be delayed due to a supposedly secret
report that was recently published. See Chris Hastings & David Bamber, Gibraltar
Faced Secret Handover Under Heath, SUNDAY TELEGRAPH, Apr. 14, 2002, at 13. This
report states that "Britain secretly planned to hand over Gibraltar to Spain [in 1971]
because it was an 'extinct volcano' inhabited by 'arrogant and unrealistic' people." Id.
The Foreign Secretary's proposal entailed giving sovereignty to Spain in exchange for a
999-year lease. Foreign Office papers also show that officials considered a compromise
of handing the isthmus to the Catholic Order of Malta under a lease agreement. See id.
Sir John Russell, the ambassador to Spain in 1971, noted that "[t]he order would allow
the citizens to be British or Spanish as they wished. We would take a long lease on
whatever we need. And there might be a provision for an eventual reversion to Spain."
Id. The order, known as the Military Hospitaller Order of St John of Jerusalem of Rhodes
and of Malta, is a humanitarian group with its own constitution, passports, stamps and
diplomatic relations with ninety countries. See id. "One Foreign Office official seems to
have been less than impressed, however. In a note attached to Sir John's original letter he
wrote: 'I don't know if Sir J.R. has ever seen the order collectively assembled. I have. I
would rather entrust Gibraltar to the 'Young Liberals'." Id.
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C. Views of the Parties
Both Spain and Great Britain refer to the Treaty of Utrecht and the
concept of self-determination to support their respective arguments
regarding the Gibraltar issue. Spain is against Gibraltar's right for self-
determination and is instead committed to the return of Gibraltar to
Spain, thereby insuring Spanish territorial integrity. 191 Great Britain, on
the other hand, while trying to support the interests of the Gibraltarians,
is anxious to reduce tensions between the two countries to come to a
better cooperation with Spain within the European Union. 192 However, a
new player has recently entered the dispute-the people of Gibraltar
who claim the right to self-determination.1 93
1. Spain
Over the past 300 years, the Spanish position has changed little. Since
the signing of the Treaty of Utrecht, Spain has interpreted the Treaty of
Utrecht as transferring something akin to possession rather than
sovereignty over the Rock. 194 Moreover, Spain has firmly embraced the
application of Resolution 1514 (XV) concerning territorial integrity by
claiming that its right to territorial unification supersedes Gibraltar's
right to self-determination.
1 95
a. Interpretation of the Treaty of Utrecht
For almost three centuries, Spain has claimed that the Treaty of Utrecht
only recognized British possession and not sovereignty. 196 But even if the
word "propriety" should include sovereignty, Spain argues, then this
should be limited in its scope. 97 "The Spanish contend that the Treaty
grants Great Britain a 'propriety' but 'without territorial jurisdiction.""
This construction would aid Spain in retaining sovereignty. 199
191. Lincoln, supra note 155, at 306; Franck & Hoffman, supra note 85, at 375-76.
192. Lincoln, supra note 155, at 306.
193. See generally J.J. Bossano, The Decolonization of Gibraltar, 18 FORDHAM
INT'L L.J. 1641 (1995).
194. Lincoln, supra note 155, at 307; MUSGRAVE, supra note 79, at 246.
195. MUSGRAVE, supra note 79, at 246.
196. See id.
197. Lincoln, supra note 155, at 307.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 307-08.
Although Spain interprets the definition of "propriety", it uses the
literal meaning of the Treaty of Utrecht to insist that the cession of
land to Great Britain does not include the isthmus, but instead is
limited to the walls and fortifications of the city of Gibraltar.z0 During
the negotiations that led to the Treaty of Utrecht, British negotiators
proposed the cession of the island in accordance with the cannon shot
201 202rule,0 1 which Spain claims was opposed by its negotiators.
b. The Right for Territorial Integrity
To use Resolution 1514 (XV) in its favor, Spain applied Resolution
1541 to the Gibraltar issue. 20 3 Resolution 1541 presents a two-part test
to determine whether a territory is considered a non-self-governing
territory and therefore eligible for decolonization under Resolution
1514 .2' First, the territory must be geographically distinct from the
colonial power; second, the territory must be distinct ethnically and/or
culturally from the colonizer.0 5 Based on those two requirements,
Spain argues that the inhabitants of the Rock are geographically,
culturally, and economically more closely related to Spain than to
Great Britain and thus, Resolution 1514 (XV) should apply.20 6
During the meetings of the Committee of Twenty-Four, Spain argued
that Spain and Gibraltar were not only geographically connected, but
also economically and demographically connected .2 7 Spain claims
that Gibraltarians cannot be defined as a "people" under Resolution
1514 (XV) because the present population of the Rock was pre-
fabricated to facilitate British rule after the original inhabitants were
expelled. 20 8 Therefore, Gibraltarians should not be granted the right to
self-determination under Resolution 1514 (XV), and instead Spain's
territorial rights should take precedence.
200. Id. at 308.
201. Id. "The cannon shot rule held.., that a sovereign could exercise authority over
the sea that [lies] within a cannon's range from the shore." Id. at 308 n.161 (citation omitted).
202. Id. at 308.
203. Lincoln, supra note 155, at 308-09.
204. Id. See also G.A. Res. 1541, U.N. GAOR, 15th Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 29,
U.N. Doc. A/4651 (1960).
205. See Lincoln, supra note 155, at 309. See also G.A. Res. 1541, U.N. GAOR,
15th Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 29, U.N. Doc. A/4651 (1960).
206. See Lincoln, supra note 155, at 309.
207. Id. at 310. Spain even claimed that Gibraltar, in connection to being part of mainland
Spain, actually lived at its expense through Gibraltar's vast smuggling operations. Id.
208. See MUSGRAVE, supra note 79, at 246.
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c. British Acts Granting Sovereignty to Gibraltar is a
Breach of the Treaty of Utrecht
Spain further contends that certain British acts regarding the isthmus
have breached the provisions of the Treaty of Utrecht. According to
Spain, the Gibraltar Constitution amounts to a breach of the pre-
emption clause, stipulated in the final paragraph of Article X of the
Treaty of Utrecht.209 This clause prohibits Great Britain from transferring
sovereignty to any other entity unless it is first offered to Spain.21°
Spain claims that this prevents Great Britain from awarding the right of
self-determination to the Gibraltarians.211
2. Great Britain
Since the signing of the Treaty in 1713, the British have insisted that
they were granted sovereignty not only over the city of Gibraltar but also
over the entire isthmus.21 2 After the intervention of the United Nations
in the dispute, Great Britain has consistently supported the right of the
people of Gibraltar to choose between Spanish or British rule and has
been increasingly willing to transfer most of its power over Gibraltar to
the Gibraltarian government.
2 1 3
a. Cession to. the Crown
The British contend that Gibraltar became a British possession
through conquest in 1704.214 Thereafter, the town and castle of Gibraltar
were ceded to Great Britain by the Treaty of Utrecht.215 In international
law, cession involves the formal transfer of title and rights over territory
209. See Lincoln, supra note 155, at 311; CASSESSE, supra note 27, at 209. This
last paragraph of Article X of the treaty states:
[a]nd in case it shall hereafter seem meet to the crown of Great Britain to grant,
sell or by any means to alienate therefrom the propriety of the said town of
Gibraltar, it is hereby agreed and concluded that the preference of having the
same shall always be given to the crown of Spain before any others.
Treaty of Utrecht, supra note 168, at 331.
210. See Treaty of Utrecht, supra note 168, at 331.
211. Lincoln, supra note 155, at 311.
212. Id. at 313; CASSESSE, supra note 27, at 209.
213. CASSESSE, supra note 27, at 209.
214. Franck & Hoffman, supra note 85, at 375.
215. Id.
from one state to another.2t 6 Usually, the two states transfer the territory
via a treaty that defines the land and the rights attached to it.2 17
Thus, Great Britain argues that the first sentence of Article X of the
Treaty grants sovereignty "forever" and "without any exception or
impediment whatsoever. z2t  Great Britain further insists that at no time
during the negotiations prior to the Treaty of Utrecht did the Spanish
diplomats indicate that Great Britain was to get anything less than full
sovereignty over the isthmus. 21 9 Moreover, by using the cannon shot
rule, the Treaty of Utrecht implicitly awards more territory to Britain
than explicitly defined in it. While one official claimed that the isthmus
was to be considered aspart of the fortifications of Gibraltar, the British
Ambassador to Spain, William Stanhope, suggested the cannon shot
principle as the justification for the extra land.22°
b. Self-Determination
Throughout the debates in the Committee of Twenty-Four and the
votes on Resolution 2231, the idea that the people of Gibraltar are the
only ones that can decide their future guided the British delegation.22'
However, hesitant to breach the reversionary provision of the Treaty of
Utrecht, the British have given no indication that they support
Gibraltar's right to self-determination if this would lead to independent
statehood.222
216. See Brian N. Mueller, Note, The Falkland Islands: Will the Real Owner Please
Stand Up, 58 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 616, 625 (1983).
217. See id.; Lee, supra note 99, at 8-9. Because cession involves transfer of title,
the acquiring state gets a derivative title. Mueller, supra note 216, at 625.
218. Lincoln, supra note 155, at 313. The first sentence of Article X of the Treaty
of Utrecht states:
[t]he Catholic King does hereby, for himself, his heirs and successors, yield to
the crown of Great Britain the full and entire propriety of the town and castle
of Gibraltar, together with the port, fortifications, and forts thereunto
belonging; and he gives up the said propriety to be held and enjoyed absolutely
with all manner of right for ever, without any exception or impediment whatsoever.
Treaty of Utrecht, supra note 172, at 330.
219. Lincoln, supra note 155, at 314. Great Britain claims that the Royal Navy's
conquest of the city of Gibraltar took sovereignty away from King Philip V. Id.
220. Id. at 315. "[W]hen a town is yielded there is tacitly yielded at the same time,
all the ground commanded by its artillery, since otherwise the cession would be of little
use." Letter from William Stanhope, British minister in Madrid to the Spanish Secretary
of State, Marques the Grimaldo, Aug. 19, 1723, quoted in Lincoln, supra note 155, at
315 n.215.
221. Lincoln, supra note 155, at 315.
222. Id. at 317.
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c. British Actions in Light of Resolution 2231 and
the Treaty of Utrecht
In accordance with Article 73 of the U.N. Charter, the British
recognize that the "interests of the inhabitants of these territories are
paramount" and to that end "take due account of the political aspirations
of the people. 223 Paragraph 2 of Resolution 1514 (XV) reiterates this
principle by stipulating that all people can freely determine their own
political status.224 Great Britain insists that the 1967 Gibraltar plebiscite
must be interpreted in the light of Resolution 1514 (XV).225  The
overwhelming support in the referendum for maintaining British rule in
the island left no doubt as to the will of the Gibraltarians and encouraged
Britain to execute the Gibraltar Constitution.226
The British maintain that modification of their existing relationship
with Gibraltar is consistent with the Treaty of Utrecht.227 However, Great
Britain will not grant complete independence to the people of Gibraltar so
as not to break the preemption clause of the Treaty of Utrecht.228
3. Gibraltar
Over the last couple of years, the people of Gibraltar have become
dissatisfied with British rule and have increasingly pursued a claim for
self-determination. 229 The Gibraltarians maintain that Resolution 2734
establishes that the principles embodied in the U.N. Charter supersede
obligations under any other international agreement. 230  Therefore, the
223. See U.N. CHARTER art. 73.
224. See discussion supra Part II.B.1.
225. See Franck & Hoffman, supra note 85, at 375.
226. Lincoln, supra note 155, at 316.
227. Id. at 317.
228. Id.
229. See id. at 318.
230. Id. at 322. The relevant text of Resolution 2734 reads as follows:
The General Assembly...
1. Solemnly reaffirms the universal and unconditional validity of
the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations
as the basis of relations among States irrespective of their size,
geographical location, level of development or political, economic
and social systems and declares that the breach of these principles
cannot be justified in any circumstances whatsoever;
2. Calls upon all States to adhere strictly in their international
relations to the purposes and principles of the Charter, including...
the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples... ;
right to self-determination should take precedence over the older obligations
established by the Treaty of Utrecht in 1713.23
Recently, Gibraltar declined the invitation to take part in the new
round of negotiations between Britain and Spain, unless it was given a
232veto over its future status. This demand was rejected by Spain who
insisted that "[t]he people of Gibraltar cannot have the right of veto over
matters being discussed by two sovereign states. 233 Gibraltar justified
its demand for a veto by claiming that Great Britain was planning to
share sovereignty over the Rock with Spain, even if Gibraltar later
rejected shared sovereignty in a referendum; 234 under the Gibraltar
Constitution, any agreement reached between Great Britain and Spain
would have to be approved in a referendum by the people of Gibraltar. 235
An agreement between Great Britain and Spain over Gibraltar would,
however, open the way for the creation of an Anglo-Spanish alliance
within the European Union, which would counterbalance the existing
Franco-German alliance.236
D. Is the Principle of Self-Determination Applicable to Gibraltar?
1. Spain's Misguided Claims to Gibraltar
Spain has consistently argued that the case of Gibraltar should not be
decided based on the wishes of its inhabitants but solely on the principle
of territorial integrity as stipulated in paragraph 6 of Resolution 1514
(XV). 237 Based on this principle and the reversionary provision of the
Treaty of Utrecht, Spain demands the return of the territory from which
it was separated in 1713, having annexed it in 1501.238
3. Solemnly reaffirms that, in the event of a conflict between the
obligations of the Members of the United Nations under the
Charter and their obligations under any other international
agreement, their obligations under the Charter shall prevail.
G.A. Res. 2734, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, at 22, U.N. Doc. A/8082 (1970).
231. See Bossano, supra note 193, at 1642.
232. See Gibraltar demands veto on future status, BBC NEWS, Oct. 31, 2001, at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/world/europe/l630056.stm (last visited Sept. 26, 2002).
233. Id. (quoting Josep Pique, Spanish Foreign Minister).
234. Gethin Chamberlain, Gibraltarians remain rock solid as 30,000 protest
against Spanish control, THE SCOTSMAN, Mar. 19, 2002, available at
http://www.thescotsman.co.uk/index.cfm?id=301552002 (last visited Dec. 29, 2002).
235. Cf. id.
236. See id.
237. Bossano, supra note 193, at 1642.
238. Id.
[VOL. 4: 339, 2003] The Rock and the Bailiwick
SAN DIEGO INT'L L.J.
Both Lincoln and Bossano claim that this reversionary principle is
anachronistic to the principles established by the U.N. Charter. 239 Both
Spain and Great Britain have followed the Treaty of Utrecht only when
it is convenient for them to do so. One treaty stipulation prevented the
British from granting Jews and Moors the right to reside in the
isthmus, 240 but Great Britain failed to comply, allowing both Jews and
Moors to settle on the island.24  Another provision prohibited Gibraltar's
66 242open communication" with the Campo area.24  Originally intended to
prevent smuggling, this provision has been generally ignored by both
parties.243 Therefore, both authors argue that the parties should also be
allowed to ignore the reversionary principle of the Treaty of Utrecht as it
impedes the Gibraltarians right to self-determination. 2"
Bossano further argues that the international world in 1713 differs in
many aspects from the present day.245 Wars and treaties have changed
the national borders worldwide,246 and supporting Spain's claim would
imply that nearly every European country could lay claim to the territoryf n 247
of another. Moreover, applying Spain's rationale for its claim on
Gibraltar would in fact give a theoretical claim by Morocco precedence
over Spain's because the first people to settle in Gibraltar were Moors.248
2. Failure of the International Community to Recognize
Gibraltar's Right
By supporting the Spanish claim of territorial unity based on
geographical borders predating the Treaty of Utrecht, the United Nations
has indicated that historic title can oust the right of self-determination.249
However, both Lincoln and Bossano use Resolution 1514 (XV) to argue
that Gibraltarians should be considered as a people as defined by
Resolution 1514 (XV) and therefore should be given the right to self-
239. Lincoln, supra note 155, at 326; Bossano, supra note 193, at 1643.
240. See Treaty of Utrecht, supra note 168, at 330.
241. Lincoln, supra note 155, at 326.
242. See Treaty of Utrecht, supra note 168.
243. Lincoln, supra note 155, at 326.
244. See id. Cf Bossano, supra note 193, at 1643.
245. See Bossano, supra note 199, at 1644.
246. See id. at 1643.
247. See id.
248. Cf id.
249. MUSGRAVE, supra note 79, at 245.
determination.2 The inhabitants of Gibraltar, even if considered to be
"imported", "have forged a unique cultural, political, and economic
entity that is neither Spanish nor British[, ' 251 and have resided there
"long enough to develop the required connection to it."
252
Gibraltar's right to self-determination must include the right to be
present during the negotiations between Spain and Great Britain. 3 The
reversionary clause of the Treaty of Utrecht does not prevent Gibraltar
from participating in the talks; it is only when full sovereignty would be
transferred from Great Britain to the isthmus that the Treaty of Utrecht
may be breached.
3. Conclusion
The interpretation of the United Nations that historic title may
supersede the inhabitants' right to self-determination could have far-
reaching consequences because the modern day borders are mainly the
result of numerous wars and peace treaties.254 These consequences would
not only exist on an international level but would manifest themselves
also on national levels. If Gibraltar would achieve special status under
the Spanish rule, as envisioned by Spain, then the constitutional positions
of other Spanish regions, like Catalonia and Basque, would presumably
have to be revisited as well because they could not be expected to settle
for anything less than a similar status as Gibraltar.
255
Furthermore, "[i]nfinitesimal smallness has never been seen as a
reason to deny self-determination to a population., 256  The practical
implication of the right to self-determination for a small territory, such
as Gibraltar, is the need for independent economic survival. 7
Economically, Gibraltar is trying to transform itself into an international
tax haven, or offshore financial center (OFC),258 claiming European
250. Lincoln, supra note 155, at 328; Bossano, supra note 193, at 1644.
251. Lincoln, supra note 155, at 328 (citations omitted).
252. Grant, supra note 125, at 636-37.
253. Lincoln, supra note 155, at 329.
254. See Bossano, supra note 193, at 1643.
255. See Franck & Hoffman, supra note 85, at 378.
256. Id. at 383.
257. See Orlow, supra note 124, at 125.
258. Id. at 132. Earlier, OFC's were considered to be "the refuge of [both]
international businesses trying to exploit currency exchange advantages and the
extremely wealthy." Id. at 128. Due to the internationalization of industries, there grew
a need for international financial services. In response to this need, OFC's started to
furnish financial services that minimized tax exposure, transaction, and currency
exchange costs. Smaller countries, particularly in Europe, seized this opportunity to
serve as OFC's based on the reciprocal tax treaties that allowed for the designation of the
OFC as the site for the calculation of tax basis. Id. at 129. Thus, "OFC's developed a
market for [financial] services [based on the exploitation of] anomalies and asymmetries
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Union membership based on Great Britain's membership in the European
Union, with an exemption to the EC Custom Tariff and Common
Agricultural Policy. 259 Gibraltar's economic transformation is adamantly
opposed by Spain,26° which claims that Gibraltar will serve as a haven
for tax dodgers and money launderers.261
IV. THE CASE OF THE CHANNEL ISLANDS
A. Introduction
The Channel Islands are located at the entrance of the Gulf of Saint-
Malo in the English Channel, eighty miles south of the English Coast.
262
These islands were part of the Duchy of Normandy before the Norman
Conquest of 1066 and are considered to be in "appenage", or possessed
by the British Crown.263 The Channel Islands consist of two bailiwicks:
Jersey and Guernsey. The bailiwick of Jersey is comprised of the islands of
Jersey, Ecrehous, and Les Minquiers; the bailiwick of Guernsey consists
of Guernsey, Alderney, Sark, Herm, Jethou, Lihou, and Brecqhou.26
Both bailiwicks are administered according to local laws afd
customs. 265 Governmental and judicial proceedings are conducted in
English in Guernsey, although most inhabitants speak Norman French as
their first language; Jersey uses French for its governmental proceedings.
The British government, with prior consultation of the bailiwicks' local
governments, may legislate matters relating to defense, foreign policy,
and broadcasting.
B. History of the Channel Islands' Acquisition
Until around 6,500 B.C. the Channel Islands were connected with the
French mainland.266 With the invasion of the Roman legions in 50 B.C.,
Jersey became known as Caesarea, Guernsey as Sarnia, and Alderney
in the international financial markets [and] the lack of uniform financial controls
between national jurisdictions." Id.
259. See id. at 132.
260. Id. at 132 n.168.
261. Id.




266. About the Bailiwick, at http://www.gov.gg./lcc/aa-history.htm (last visited Dec.
29, 2002).
became Ridunia.267 A stepping stone into France for the Vikings in the
ninth century,268 France tried to buy peace by granting the Norse land
that later became known as the Duchy of Normandy. 269 Duke William
II, the Conqueror (1035-87), seized the English throne in 1066 after the
Battle of Hastings, and brought the Channel Islands, Normandy and
England under the same jurisdiction.27 o
This Anglo-Norman empire was inherently unstable-when Richard
the Lionheart died in 1199, claims to the throne were made by both
Richard's brother John and cousin Arthur.2 7' War broke out, and in
1204 John was driven from the mainland part of the Duchy of Normandy
and was only able to maintain the Channel Islands' allegiance by
promising them the continuance of their ancient laws and privileges,
thereby laying the foundation for their self-government.272 These islands
were the target of frequent hit-and-run raids during the Hundred Years'
War between England and France.273 The French made the tempting
offer of union with France in exchange for a firm confirmation of self-
government; 274 to keep the Channel Islands' allegiance, King Edward III
had to match the French offer and presented them a charter stipulating
that the islands were entitled to "hold and retain all privileges, liberties,
immunities and customs granted by our forbears or of other legal
competency, and that they enjoy then freely without molestation by
ourselves, our heirs or officers. 275
During the War of the Roses, the French took advantage of the feud
between the Houses of York and Lancaster, capturing the islands in 1461
and holding them as part of Normandy for the next seven years.276 In
1483, Edward IV of England and Louis XI of France agreed on the
neutrality of the Channel Islands in any future conflicts between their
countries.277 Soon thereafter, these islands were divided into two bailiwicks
for administrative purposes.
278
267. Id. The Channel Islands were probably ruled from Lyons but there is evidence
that Rome left the islands largely to their own devices, as Britain does today. Id.
268. See id.
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Between 1760 and 1815, many fortifications were built in the Channel
Islands to protect them during the French wars against Great Britain.279
During this period, the French made several attempts to recapture the
Channel Islands, one of which nearly succeeded.28 ° During the French
Revolution, the Channel Islands became a refuge for French clergymen,
aristocrats, and royalists;281 initially, these refugees were welcomed but
as time went by the islanders returned to regarding them with suspicion
because they were considered to be the hereditary enemies of the
Channel Islanders.282 In 1794, the French Committee of Public Safety
ordered the invasion of the Channel Islands,283 but shortly before the
attack the French realized that the costs of an invasion would far
outweigh the gains, and the invasion plans were cancelled.284
The old dispute between Great Britain and France was revived in the
late twentieth century because sovereignty over the Channel Islands
determines the allocation of the economic development rights to the
continental shelf.285 Although the last serious attempt by the French
government to gain control of the Channel Islands was in 1953, a group
of French monarchists "invaded" the Channel Islands in 1998.286
C. Claim of Title: Conquest, Occupation, or Prescription?
Customary international law has traditionally considered five methods
by which a State can acquire territory: 1) accretion; 2) cession; 3) annexation
279. RAOUL LEMPRIERE, HISTORY OF THE CHANNEL ISLANDS 130 (1974).
280. See id. at 131. The first attempted invasion of Jersey was launched on May 1,
1779 by the Prince of Nassau, but it was not pressed home and no landing was effected.
Less than two years later, on January 6, 1781, an expedition led by Baron de Rullecourt,
a soldier of fortune, landed at La Rocque by night. Two battles ensued resulting in the
signing of capitulation by the Jersey lieutenant-governor who was caught in bed at home
by the invaders. The Jerseymen, refusing to obey the order to surrender, fought on and
eventually defeated the French invasion. See id.
281. See id. at 133.
282. See id.
283. See id. at 135.
284. See id.
285. See Channel Islands, supra note 11, at 87.
286. See Carrissa Bub, French 'invade' British Island, BBC NEWS, Sept. 1, 1998,
at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/162190.stm (last visited Sept. 30, 2002). The invasion
occurred in name of the King of Patagonia. Id. The marines of King Orelie-Antoine I
stamped the name of the Kingdom of Patagonia on the Minquiers rocks and hoisted its
flag. Id. Their statement included that this was the second royal landing after the initial
landing on June 1, 1984 as a response to Britain's unacceptable occupation of the
Falkland Islands, a territory of Patagonia. Id.
or conquest; 4) occupation; and, 5) prescription.287 These different modes
of acquisition are important to explain titles of sovereignty that go back
in history. 288  While the theory behind each method of acquisition
appears to be clear, the practice is not-the Channel Islands controversy
involves three of the five methods.
Annexation or conquest generally involves the taking of territory during
an armed conflict.289 Up to the Second World War, this right of conquest
was recognized as "the right of a military victor to sovereignty over the
conquered territory and its inhabitants." 29° To establish a conquest under
customary international law, two requirements have to be fulfilled: 1) the
conqueror must displace the previous sovereign in that territory; and, 2)
the conqueror must transfer its own sovereignty over the conquered land
by annexing it.291 The Channel Islands were part of the French kingdom
during the ninth century when they were invaded by the Vikings and used
as a stepping stone for an invasion of France. When William the
Conqueror defeated King Herald at the Battle of Hastings, he unified the
Duchy of Normandy, including the Channel Islands, with the English
Crown, effectively establishing English sovereignty over the Islands.
Occupation can be defined as "the act of appropriation by a state by
which it intentionally acquires sovereignty over such territory as is at the
,,292time not under the sovereignty of another state. ' 2 To establish a valid
claim under occupation, the occupation must be effective. 293 This legal
theory was fuither expanded by the Las Palmas arbitration294 where the
arbitral tribunal indicated that sovereignty involves "the exclusive right
to display the activities of a state.., and the continuous and peaceful
display of the functions of State within a given region." 295 In the case of
small, isolated islands, the tribunal recognized that there is no absolute
requirement to display sovereignty at every moment and in every place.296
Rather, the geography of the territory may influence the manifestation of
297territorial sovereignty.
287. Lee, supra note 99, at 1-2; Mueller, supra note 216, at 624.
288. Lee, supra note 99, at 2.
289. Id. at 10.
290. Id. at 10-11.
291. Mueller, supra note 216, at 627.
292. See Lee, supra note 99, at 3 (citation omitted).
293. See Mueller, supra note 216, at 629.
294. Island of Las Palmas Case (U.S. v. Neth.), 2 R.I.A.A. 829 (1928). This
conflict arose between the United States and the Netherlands concerning the sovereignty
over an isolated, but inhabited island located between the Philippines and the former
Dutch East Indies. See id.
295. Id. at 839-40.
296. Brian K. Murphy, Comment, Dangerous Ground: The Spratly Islands and
International Law, I OCEAN & COASTAL L.J. 187, 198 (1995).
297. Id.
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The Channel Islands have been under the continuous control of the
English Crown since the ninth century. People settled on the islands and
a government and administration were gradually established. Even
when King John was driven from the Duchy of Normandy in 1204, he
emphasized the Channel Islands' importance by granting them a
continuance of their ancient laws and privileges. Even though the
French occupied the Channel Islands for a period of seven years starting
in 1461 (and the Germans during the Second World War), this act
cannot be considered influential enough to displace the continuous
British possession of the Channel Islands.2 98 Over the centuries, Great
Britain has displayed activities of a state over the Channel Islands by
protecting the territory from French invasions.
Prescriptive title over territory arises when one state extinguishes
another state's title through adverse possession; there is no general rule
that governs the necessary length of time to substantiate a prescriptive
claim.299 The requirements to be fulfilled are four-fold: 1) possession
must be exercised by the State; 2) it must be peaceful and uninterrupted;
3) it must be public; and, 4) possession must endure for a certain length
of time.300 The French could claim that Great Britain's claim of possession
over the Channel Islands though prescription of title is weak because the
third requirement of peaceful and uninterrupted possession may not be
satisfied. The Channel Islands have been subject of many French attacks
and invasions over the centuries and the French have never fully
relinquished their claim over these islands.
So far, the only time the ICJ has been called upon by Great Britain and
France to decide the sovereignty issue regarding the Channel Islands, the
dispute was limited to the Minquiers and Ecrehos, a group of isolated
and uninhabited islets considered to be part of the bailiwick of Jersey. 301
The ICJ held that when an ambiguity exists, actual display of authority
and evidence of possession are of decisive importance in determining
sovereignty issues.30 2 Although both parties produced treaties and other
298. See generally Minquiers and Ecrehos (Gr. Brit. v. Fr.) 1953 I.C.J. 47 (Nov.
17). In his individual opinion, Judge Levi Carneiro stated that Great Britain has always
shown a continuous and keen interest in the Channel Islands as opposed to the French,
who displayed a certain indifference or a much less lively and assiduous interest in the
territory. Id. at 87 (Carneiro, J., individual opinion).
299. Lee, supra note 99, at 12-13. See also Mueller, supra note 216, at 631-32.
300. See Mueller, supra note 216, at 632-33.
301. See Minquiers and Ecrehos, supra note 298, at 47.
302. See id. at 70-71.
historical documents in an attempt to prove their respective ancient and
historic title, the ICJ refused to resolve historical controversies and
instead relied on evidence which related directly to the possession of
the Channel Islands and not indirect inferences deduced from medieval
events.3 °3 Finding that Great Britain has exercised jurisdiction and
governmental authority over both islets, the Court established
sovereignty in the British Crown.3°4 However, this decision is limited to
these particular islets and does not include the bailiwick of Guernsey or
the island of Jersey. On the other hand, the ICJ's holding could be used
to reinforce the British's claim of sovereignty over all the Channel
Islands.3 °5 Thus, British sovereignty over the Channel Islands is based
on the original conquest of these islands by the Vikings followed by acts
of occupation by the British Crown, which indicate its continuing
interest in the territory.3 °6
D. Is There a Case for Self-Determination?
Unlike Gibraltar, Great Britain has always considered the Channel
Islands to be a possession of the British Crown, not a colony; therefore
the Channel Islands were not added to the list of non-self-governing and
trust territories of Article 73 of the U.N. Charter. 307  However, even
though the bailiwicks are not colonies, they are not integral parts of
303. See id. at 57.
304. See id. at 72. In 1959, the French Cour de Cassation (comparable to the U.S.
Supreme Court) adopted this finding of the ICJ. David M. Reilly & Sarita Ordonez,
Note, Effect of the Jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice on National
Courts, 28 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 435, 472 (1996). The French Cour de Cassation
accepted as evidence of fact British sovereignty over the islands, although holding that
the Channel Islands are outside British territorial waters. Id.
305. See Minquiers and Ecrehos, supra note 298, at 99 (Carneiro, J., individual
opinion). In his individual opinion, Judge Levi Carneiro stated:
[j]ust as a State which has occupied the coast or an important part of an island
is deemed to have occupied the island as a whole, the occupation of the
principal islands of an archipelago must also be deemed to include the
occupation of islets and rocks in the same archipelago, which have not been
actually occupied by another State.
Id. (Carneiro, J., individual opinion).
306. As Judge Levi Carneiro stated in his individual opinion in Minquiers and
Ecrehos:
[t]he origin of the occupation of the islands [Minquiers and Ecrehos] by the
English being clearly defined and the circumstances confirming that occupation
being acknowledged, the acts carried out during this occupation, although they
are scattered in time, bear witness to the continuity of that occupation and
reflect the "slow evolution" of the process whereby sovereignty is established.
Id. at 104 (Carneiro, J., individual opinion).
307. See Britain's Deficient Democracy, at http://www.centreforcitizenship.org/over.html
(last visited Dec. 29, 2002). This status of "Crown Dependency" can be compared to the
situation of Puerto Rico and Guam vis-A-vis the United States. Id.
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Great Britain; despite the fact that the residents of the islands are British
citizens, they are not citizens of the European Union and they are not
entitled to vote for representatives at Westminster as these islands have
their own independent judiciary and legislature.3 °8
As is Gibraltar, the Channel Islands are a small state with an international
status as a tax haven.30 9 The Channel Islands market themselves as being
"all things to all tax avoiders" and they refuse to be considered as a "pet
haven" of Great Britain. 310 Because both bailiwicks have their own
legislature and judiciary, they maintain lower personal and corporate tax
rates than Great Britain.
The Islanders' desire to maintain this status quo can be attributed to
the success of their economy and the high standard of living in the
bailiwicks.3 12 Their situation can be considered as a manifestation of the
internal right to self-determination because the Channel Islands have
maintained their own political, economic, social, and cultural
development within the framework of an existing state.31 3
V. CONCLUSION
The concept of self-determination has been in constant evolution. The
first major codification of the principle resulted in Resolution 1514
(XV), which indicated that all peoples have a right to self-determination.
What constitutes "peoples" for the purposes of this resolution has
evolved over the years from the limited definition of territorially defined
populations to the broad interpretation of national or ethnic cultural
minorities wishing to live according to their own traditions and customs.
This right to self-determination is, according to paragraph 6 of Resolution
1514 (XV), subject to the internationally recognized principle of
territorial integrity, even if the claim for territorial unity is based on
historic title. However, the ICJ in Namibia and Western Sahara seems
to indicate that a claim for return of territory based on historic title is
subordinate to the inhabitants' right of self-determination.
308. Id.
309. See Orlow, supra note 124, at 127. "A country is considered to be an international
tax haven when foreign persons, corporate or individual, receive respite from their own
domestic tax system." Id.
310. Id. at 130.
311. See id. at 134. In Jersey, financial services have replaced agriculture and
tourism as the main source of income. Id. at 134 n.194.
312. See Britain's Deficient Democracy, supra note 307.
313. Van der Vyver, supra note 104, at 11.
By including Gibraltar in the list of non-self-governing and trust
territories of Article 73 of the U.N. Charter, Great Britain demonstrated
that it considered the territory a colony. The people of Gibraltar are
territoriality and culturally distinct from their British colonizer; therefore
they can be considered as "peoples" under Resolution 1514 (XV) and
thus have the right to self-determination. When the U.N. General Assembly
issued Resolution 2353, stating that the Spanish claim for territorial
unity based on the Treaty of Utrecht takes precedence over Gibraltar's
right to self-determination, it did not follow the ICJ's decision in
Western Sahara. Although Spain would like to affect a return to its
territorial integrity of 1704, the wishes of the people of Gibraltar should
come first. Any other outcome would end in the reshaping of the world's
landscape because most current borders are the result of numerous wars
and peace treaties.
Because of its unique character as a possession of the British Crown,
the Channel Islands were not included in the list of non-self-governing
and trust territories. Although being territoriality and culturally distinct
from Great Britain, the people of the Channel Islands could be qualified
as peoples under Resolution 1514 (XV) and therefore claim a right to
self-determination. Over the years, the Channel Islands have developed
their own judiciary, legislature, and economy; they only rely on the
mainland for defense and foreign affairs. As such, it could be claimed
that the Channel Islands have effectively received an internal right to
self-determination. As long as Westminster does not encroach on their
independence, the economy is stable, and France does not seriously
pursue a dubious historic claim over these islands, no external right for
self-determination needs to be claimed.
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